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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

A taxpayer started a suit on a claim for refund disallowed by the commis
sioner eight days after the statute of limitations had apparently estopped the
bringing of such suit. It developed at the hearing that the taxpayer had not
received from the commissioner a notice of the disallowance of the claim until
after the statutory period had elapsed. The court held that
“The failure of an officer of the government to notify a taxpayer of the
disallowance of a claim for refund within the period prescribed by section
3226 of the Revised Statutes, may not defeat the right of a taxpayer to sue
for recovery of taxes. ...” {Mahoning Railroad Co. v. U. S. A., U. S.
district court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.)
Here is another case in some respects similar to this one.
A taxpayer was endeavoring to compromise tax deficiencies for the years
1916 to 1919 inclusive, aggregating $145,414.69. While the negotiations were
in progress, the commissioner notified the taxpayer of an overassessment of
$13,726.72 in 1920 taxes. Later the commissioner applied the overassessment
against the 1917 deficiency, but failed to notify the taxpayer of the reduction of
the 1917 deficiency. At a still later date, the commissioner accepted a com
promise of the outstanding assessments against the taxpayer for the years 1916
to 1919 inclusive, stating the total amount to be compromised as $145,414.69.
The taxpayer, believing he was compromising a tax liability of $145,414.69,
paid the amount agreed upon as a compromise and later discovered that the
total tax liability compromised was $131,687.97. Suit was brought and the
court held that
“A taxpayer may recover the amount of an overassessment for 1920,
applied by the collector ... as a credit against an additional assessment
... no notice of which was received by the taxpayer until it received the
certificate of assessment in January, 1925, where the commissioner in
December, 1924, accepted an offer in compromise made in October, 1924,
without actual knowledge on the part of the taxpayer of the collector’s
application of the overassessment. . . " (Arkwright Mills v. U. S.,
U. S. district court, Massachusetts.)
An article in the July number of the Internal Revenue News, on the subject of
working papers, contains conclusions which seem contrary to the experience of
most public accountants. The article was written by Thomas H. Steele,
internal-revenue agent of the Greensboro, N. C., division.
Mr. Steele gives it as his opinion that an internal-revenue agent may be
judged by his working papers more correctly than by his report. He says:
“The greater the ability and the more competent the agent, the more
working papers he will produce.”
Probably every report writer in a public accounting firm will agree with us in
saying that the more competent the auditor, the fewer working papers he hands
in, yet no essential data are omitted. Despite the brevity of the work sheets,
the whole history of the examinations can be readily traced in them. The
accountant who accumulates a large quantity of working papers is often inef
ficient in his arrangement of material. He is apt to have a tendency toward
repetition and duplication, in his eagerness to be quite thorough and clear.
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One of the keenest accountants we know has the smallest possible output of
working papers. There is not a fact missed in them and it is never necessary to
re-consult the books. His work sheets provide a complete financial history of
the enterprise, and federal and state tax returns can easily be prepared from
them.
Many accountants, we believe, have had the same experience—with which it
is difficult to reconcile Mr. Steele’s opinion. Auditing accounts for the verifica
tion of tax returns is not widely different from the customary audit performed
by a public accountant. In justification of Mr. Steele’s remark, however, it
must be remembered that revenue agents examine and analyze the records of
companies where public accountants have never been engaged and where the
management is often wholly ignorant of the value of proper accounting methods.
The agent’s task in such cases is arduous, as an ordered course of investigation
is often impossible. As far as these instances are concerned Mr. Steele may be
correct in his opinion. When one remembers the archaic “day book” or
“blotter,” as it was aptly called, which served as a haphazard record of jumbled
details, frequently almost illegible, it is easy to feel sympathy with the revenue
agent who must bring order from such disorder and winnow from much chaff the
grist of “taxable income.” Who is there to criticize if he turns in to his chief a
voluminous bundle of working papers?

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
A taxable dividend and not a stock dividend was received in 1920, where a
corporation charged against surplus an account due from a partnership which
was incorporated in 1920, the members of which were the same as the stock
holders of the corporation, which was treated as a part of the subscription price
of the stockholders to the stock of the new corporation, the balance of the sur
plus was paid in cash to the stockholders and the stock of the new corporation
was issued to such stockholders or their nominees. (U. S. district court, M. D.
Tennessee, United States v. Joseph Moore Warren.)
A taxpayer may recover the amount of an overassessment for 1920, applied
by the collector on September 20, 1924, as a credit against an additional assess
ment for 1917, no notice of which was received by the taxpayer until it received
the certificate of overassessment in January, 1925, where the commissioner in
December, 1924, accepted an offer in compromise made in October, 1924, with
out actual knowledge on the part of the taxpayer of the collector’s application of
the overassessment of $75,000 in settlement of a total outstanding assessment
of $145,414.69 for the years 1916 to 1919, without any reduction in the amount
of the 1917 overassessment for the credit applied. (U. S. district court,
Massachusetts, Arkwright Mills v. United States.)
Amount received in 1919, by the insured upon the maturity of non-assignable
endowment policies taken out in 1899, payable to his estate, the face of which
together with a cash dividend then to be apportioned by the insurance com
pany was payable in 1919, constitutes taxable profit in the difference between
the amount received and the value of the non-assignable policy to the owner,
March 1, 1913, computed as the discount value on that date of the amount
which he could then reasonably expect to realize at the maturity of the policy.
Article 72 (b), Regulations 45 (1920 edition), held contrary to law in so far as it
attempts to regulate income tax on proceeds of insurance policies haying a fair
market value on March 1, 1913. (Circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit,
Robert H. Lucas, collector, v. A. J. A. Alexander.)
Section 234 (a) (14) (a) and (b), act of 1918, permitting a deduction for 1918,
of a substantial loss resulting from any material reduction (not due to tempo
rary fluctuation) of the value of the inventory for 1918, sustained after the
close of the taxable year creates a single comprehensive right to be accorded
equally and generally to taxpayers, and a taxpayer who, at the time of filing
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its 1918 return, filed a claim for abatement because of a reduction in value of
its inventory between the close of its 1918 taxable year and the date of filing its
return may not deduct such losses in its 1918 return where, by the close of its
taxable year 1919, it had not sustained a loss through the sale of its inventory
nor due to depreciation on the portion of the inventory on hand at the close of
its 1918 taxable year. (U. S. district court, N. D. Iowa, E. D., H. B. Glover Co.
v. Lars E. Bladine, collector.)
Congress has the power to tax any transmission of property reflected by
death even though by the law of the decedent’s domicile such property was not
part of his estate and the enactment of section 402 (e), act of 1918, indicates a
clear intent to exercise that power.
The power of appointment exercised by a decedent, the beneficiary of a
testamentary trust created for the benefit of the grantor’s children providing
that the trust was to endure throughout the lives of all his grandchildren then in
being and for twenty-one years thereafter, construed by the state court to be a
power to appoint one-seventh of the entire estate, exercisable either by deed or
by will, the disposition thereof taking effect in possession (a) of the income only
upon the death of the donee, and (b) of the principal, upon the termination of
the trust, was held to be a general power of appointment within the meaning of
section 402 (e), act of 1918, the value of such property passing under such power
of appointment to be included in decedent’s gross estate, since the latitude of
the donee’s power of disposition rather than the quantum of the interest dis
posed of or the time of its vesting is important. (U. S. district court, E. D.
Pennsylvania, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., executor, v. Blakely D. Mc
Caughn, collector.)

Loans evidenced by promissory notes, inadequately secured, made to, and
heavy overdrafts by, officers and directors of a bank are not deductible (a) as
losses where the bank officers acted without fraudulent purpose to injure the
bank or to appropriate the sums to their own purposes to the detriment of the
bank, nor (b) as bad debts where charged off in a subsequent year. (U. S.
circuit court of appeals, ninth circuit, E. W. Porter, commissioner of finance,
liquidating agent of the Citizens State Bank of Buhl, Idaho, v. United States.)
A waiver executed and filed by a Pennsylvania corporation resulting from
the merger and consolidation of two Pennsylvania corporations was held valid
for the purpose of accomplishing a refund of income taxes overpaid by one of the
merged companies for the fiscal year 1921, all the rights, franchises and privi
leges of the constituent companies, including the right to claim the taxes in
volved, under the Pennsylvania law, being transferred and vested in such
corporation, which is exercising such right as the taxpayer within the meaning
of section 284 (g), act of 1926. (U. S. district court, M. D. Pennsylvania,
Lyman H. Howe Films Co. v. David W. Phillips, collector.)
The failure of an officer of the government to notify a taxpayer of the dis
allowance of a claim for refund within the period prescribed by section 3226,
Revised Statutes, may not defeat the right of the taxpayer to sue for recovery of
taxes, where notice of such disallowance was received by mail from the com
missioner and suit was begun more than two years after the disallowance of the
claim. (U. S. district court, N. D. Ohio, E. D., The Mahoning Coal Railroad
Co., et al. v. United States.)
The estate tax imposed by the act of 1918, upon the value of the interest
passing to the surviving spouse by operation of the Nebraska and Iowa statutes
violates the constitutional limitation upon the power of congress to lay direct
taxes. (U. S. district court, Nebraska, Albert Krug, et al. v. Allen, collector,
et al.)

A lessee of buildings in the business of holding property under long-term
leases and of subletting it for shorter terms is entitled, under the act of 1918,
to a deduction for exhaustion of such buildings held under ninety-nine year
leases, renewable forever, requiring the lessee to maintain on the premises build
ings of the fair cost or value of not less than a stipulated amount in no case less
than the value of the existing buildings and to keep the buildings in “like
conditions as the same are now in” since, for every practical purpose, they are
the lessee’s buildings and constitute his capital so far as they are consumed in
his business.
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The court could not find that rulings, including the regulations, cited in the
argument by the government, were made pursuant to any uniform depart
mental construction which might be said to have received legislative sanction
by the passage of subsequent revenue acts, and the expressions in an office deci
sion, which might be thought to be applicable should be treated as the depart
ment itself treats such rulings—as merely applying to the facts then under
consideration. (U. S. circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, J. Harry Wiener v.
Harry H. Weiss and C. F. Routzahn, collectors.)
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